A Focus on U.S. Leadership Surrounds the Gulf States Crisis
By Colby Cyrus/Contributing Writer
In the midst of a crisis overtaking the Gulf Cooperation Council, a panel discussion hosted by the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) aimed to understand where the United States goes from here.
The title of the discussion, Washington’s Role and Interests in the G.C.C. Crisis, accurately depicted what the panelists specifically attempted to identify.
Featured in the talk were Ellen Laipson of the Stimson Center, Ali Vaez of International Crisis Group, David Des Roches of National Defense University, and Hamad Althunayyan of University of Maryland-College Park. Hussein Ibish, senior residential scholar of AGSIW, moderated the panel.
When considering the American national interests of maximal importance, the scholars had some different ideas. Enabling stability in the Gulf was a common denominator, feeding into the other objectives such as stabilizing global energy and defeating ISIS. The relationship between these objectives, however, was left unclear in terms of how they influence each other and how they can be obtained simultaneously.
Security in the region also plays a large role, added Des Roches; especially, as it relates to containing the influence of Iran in the region. For that matter, the consensus was that there is no identifiable purpose or goal of containing Iran, but it was assumed that President Trump’s visit to the country made it more fearful about attempts at containment. The consequences of Iran’s supposed fear are yet to be seen.
Vaez noted that any policies towards Iran should be backed by specific goals, as most containment strategies against the nation have generally resulted in unforeseen repercussions. Laipson noted the irony of Iran’s recent missile strikes against an enemy that it shares with the United States, considering the animosity between the two nations.
In regards to the funding of anti-terror and the cutting of diplomatic ties with Qatar, Althunayyan brought up the need for tangible evidence if one state is to accuse another of sponsoring terrorism. He also suggested that the crisis unfolding in Qatar is less and less about terrorism, yet failed to identify any additional causes of the rift.
The conversation also took an approach centered around the military, with Des Roches emphasizing the sale of F15’s to Qatar shortly after the crisis began. He also outlined Israel’s opposition to Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) while charging that any military relationship between two states is an inherently good one.
As it related to the source of Iranian conduct in the region, Vaez argued that President Rouhani did not care much about the U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia. He also added that Iran, while not part of a security architecture, possesses an asymmetric means of defense and a forward defense policy featuring nonstate actors close to its borders (for example, Hezbollah).
While considering the role of the United States in the crisis, Laipson outlined the fact that the Trump administration illustrates a tendency to be stricter and tougher on Iran than that of his predecessor.
Above all, the panel could agree that U.S. leadership is needed to solve the issues currently taking over the G.C.C. Potentially complicating matters, however, is the notion that both sides assumed that the United States was on their side at the outset. Now, to find a solution, the United States must tread a thin and delicate line between both parties.
Despite a constructive conclusion, the discussion left some important questions unanswered. For example, is it possible to contain Iran without a regional coalition, and would the territorial powers even willingly submit to such an idea? Which long term interest should the United States prioritize?
Although the panel revealed more questions than answers, one theme was paramount. The United States, it seems, needs to strike a balance between what it feels is best long-term, not only in the region but also for itself.