All Sides Lose in the War of Attrition with Iran

posted on: Aug 19, 2026

By: Ghassan Rubeiz / Arab America Contributing Writer

Three years into the US–Israel war with Iran, the Middle East has entered a new strategic phase defined by exhaustion. The conflict has exposed the limits of American military reach, revealed Israel’s vulnerability to sustained resistance and demonstrated Iran’s capacity to absorb punishment while continuing to impose costs on its adversaries. Gulf partners now openly question US commitment and its security guarantees, and Washington’s once‑dominant regional posture looks increasingly overstretched.

Indirect talks continue to promise short‑term solutions: reopening the Strait of Hormuz and providing measures of economic relief to Iran. A sixty‑day period, in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran, was envisioned for breakthroughs – primarily neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program and facilitating Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza. If a breakthrough on Israeli land withdrawal is reached, it would be matched by two different and separate arrangements for Hamas and Hezbollah’s arms.

Iran, for its part, retains a sizable missile arsenal, and proxy forces capable of imposing high costs on both Israel and the US. Hezbollah’s missile stockpile, Iraqi militia networks, and Houthi control of strategic shipping lanes in the Red Sea give Tehran leverage despite the economic strain the country is going through. Iran cannot win decisively, but it can prevent its own defeat — and that may be enough to force Israel and the US to offer concessions.

Despite intermittent pauses in the conduct of the war, neither side has been willing to yield. Washington and Tel Aviv insist on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and curbing Iran’s missile and nuclear programs. Tehran refuses to negotiate without sanctions relief, compensation for war damage, and guarantees of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza. The war may have hardened positions rather than softened them, and each side now seems to wait for the other to blink.

Many in Israel, and some in Washington, argue that a third major strike could end the stalemate. But Iran’s strategic resilience and mosaic defense doctrine — built around decentralized command, redundancy, and autonomous regional units — was designed precisely to survive such blows. Iran has already absorbed heavy losses, including political leaders, senior commanders and critical infrastructure, yet maintained operational continuity and has been retaliating effectively. Its ability to strike US bases, disrupt shipping lanes, and sustain proxy operations suggests that another round of bombing would not force it to surrender.

Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Stephen Walt offers a useful lens here. He has long argued that Washington overestimates what force can accomplish against determined adversaries. Writing recently in Foreign Policy, Walt notes that the current war has yet to achieve any of Washington’s stated objectives and may end with Iran in a stronger strategic position than before — part of a broader pattern in which the US has struggled to translate battlefield superiority into lasting political outcomes. His point: dominance in firepower doesn’t guarantee dominance in results, especially against a state willing to absorb costs and wait out its adversary. This reinforces the case against expecting a decisive military victory over Iran.

Nor can Iran win outright. Its economy is strained; its proxy network shows signs of fatigue; it has lost Syria as a reliable ally; and domestic pressures are mounting. But resilience is not victory, and vulnerability is not defeat. The war has settled into a structural stalemate.

The October 27 national elections in Israel and the November 3 US midterm elections may open doors for limited diplomacy. Elections that bring new leaders may advance negotiations, but not substantially. In Israel, the replacement of Netanyahu’s government would not fundamentally alter its policy on occupation. As Nicholas Kristof wrote in the New York Times on August 12, after a recent visit to Israel: “Don’t expect a Palestinian state or a transformation. But the worst excesses and brutality might be reined in.”

In the US, no drastic change in policy toward Israel is likely as a result of the upcoming midterms. Currently, Republicans hold narrow Congressional majorities, but analysts expect Democrats to flip the House. A weakened US presidency argues for continued half‑baked solutions. Trump’s approval has fallen; gas prices, inflation, and war fatigue are major drivers. A president facing declining support is less able to sustain open‑ended conflict, especially one that offers no clear path to victory. Still, US policy toward Israel will not shift dramatically given the overall legislative picture, where Israel retains solid support.

The evidence is unmistakable: this conflict has hardened into a structural stalemate that no actor can break without absorbing intolerable costs. The United States cannot bomb its way to stability; Israel cannot secure its borders through perpetual occupation; and Iran cannot convert endurance into victory. A weakened US presidency argues for continued half‑baked solutions, guaranteeing only more drift and more damage. Unless the region’s leaders accept the new balance of power — granting Iran a legitimate seat at the regional table, compelling Israel to anchor its security in justice rather than force, and pushing Washington to trade military dominance for constructive diplomacy — the Middle East will remain trapped in a cycle of crises. In this war of endurance, there are no winners. Only those wise enough to stop the war can prevent the next one.

Ghassan Rubeiz is the former Middle East Secretary of the World Council of Churches. Earlier, he taught psychology and social work in his country of birth, Lebanon, and later in the United States, where he currently lives. He has contributed to political commentary for the past twenty years and has delivered occasional public talks on peace, justice, and interfaith topics. You can reach him at rubeizg@gmail.com

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab America. The reproduction of this article is permissible with proper credit to Arab America and the author.

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